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Early in 2014 in The Thinker (Q1, 2014), Thabo Mbeki laid out his vision for the future of the 
progressive movement in Africa. The 
core of this agenda, was “establishing 
genuinely democratic systems of 
government, including accountable 
State systems.” He is harsh about the 
reality of democracy in many African 
countries in which “State systems 
have been reduced to a patrimony 
of a predatory elite, controlled by 
its self-serving ‘professional political 
class’.” “Thus”, he continues, “does 
the putative democratic state become 
a social institution which serves the 
interests of a ‘rent-seeking’ elite 
whose goals amount to no more than 
preserving its political power and using 
this power to extract the ‘rent’ which 
ensures its enrichment.”
Harsh words indeed, though ones 
which have become almost a cliché 
with respect to the governance of 
many African states. Yet, by an odd 
coincidence, at around same time, The 
Economist, august journal of the western 
business elite, had a front-page splash 
What’s gone wrong with democracy?,1 
the title of a long essay inside which 
opened by suggesting “that democracy 
is going through a difficult time. Where 
autocrats have been driven from office, 
their opponents have mostly failed to 
create viable democratic regimes. Even 
in established democracies, flaws in the 
system have become worryingly visible 
and disillusion with politics is rife. Yet 
a few years ago democracy looked as 
though it would dominate the world.” 
The piece ends with the quotation 
from a past US President often found 
in The Economist: “democracy never 
lasts long. It wastes, exhausts and 
murders itself. There was never a 
democracy yet that did not commit 
suicide”. John Adams wrote this in 
1814 and it is unclear precisely to what 
he was referring. There had been a 
brief flourishing of democratic intent 
in France a few years before, quickly 
snuffed out, and there had been 
the original ‘democracy’ in Athens 
copied by a few other Greek city-
states around the fourth century BC 
in which, it is believed, around 15% 
of the population took part. There 
was, of course, the Roman Republic 
which we know ended badly on the 
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Ides of March and also the Republic 
of Geneva about which the less said 
the better. Adams in fact had precious 
little evidence on which to base his 
assertion and, of course, it would not 
have occurred to him that a country 
whose franchise excluded all women 
and those males held in servitude could 
not be seen as a democracy. Even so, 
recent history suggests that he had a 
point, given that in 2014 alone, three 
elected governments were overthrown 
and replaced by self-appointed cliques.
Doubts about the state of democracy 
are not confined to right-wing 
journals. The eminent left historian, 
Perry Anderson, recently published 
a coruscating essay mainly about 
the corruption of Italian democracy 
but which opened with a lament for 
European democracy in general.2
Europe is ill. How seriously, and 
why, are matters not always easy 
to judge. But among the symptoms 
three are conspicuous and inter-
related. The first, and most familiar, 
is the degenerative drift of democracy 
across the continent. Referendums are 
regularly overturned, if they cross the 
will of the rulers; voters whose views 
are scorned by elites shun the assembly 
that nominally represents them, turnout 
falling with each successive election; 
executives domesticate or manipulate 
legislatures with greater ease; parties 
lose members; voters lose belief that 
they count, as political choices narrow 
and promises of difference on the 
hustings dwindle or vanish in office.
He continues with a roll-call of 
distinguished European politicians 
who have been implicated in various 
ways in huge corruption scandals: 
amongst them Helmut Kohl, Jacques 
Chirac, Gerhard Schröder, Horst 
Köhler (former head of the IMF), 
Christine Lagarde (current head of the 
IMF), Bertie Ahern, (past Irish prime-
minister), Mariano Rajoy (current 
Spanish prime-minister) and on through 
Greece, Turkey and the U.K. The sums 
involved are not small: Helmut Kohl 
was found to have amassed some two 
million Deutschmarks from donors 
whose names he refused to reveal. 
Not one of this illustrious roll-call has 
so far been called to account though 
Lagarde is currently under criminal 
investigation, something which seems 
not to impede her job ruling the global 
financial system.
Nor is the problem of dynastic 
political elites any preserve of 
Africa. Arguably the most important 
democracy in the world, certainly the 
largest, is India, in which 814 million 
people went to the polls in May, 2014. 
These elections were widely publicised 
as resulting in the overthrow of the 
Gandhi family which had ruled India 
for four generations and bringing the 
Bharatiya Janata Party to power, led by 
a man of humble origins with no family 
connections to assist him. However, as 
Patrick French has shown in a recent 
book, India: a Portrait,3 nearly 30% of 
members of the Indian parliament, the 
Lok Sabha, were connected directly 
by family to their political posts whilst, 
startlingly, all members under 30 were 
the children of former politicians. 
There is little sign of voter disillusion 
with electoral democracy in India with 
the 2014 election showing the highest 
ever turnout at 66.4%, a respectably 
high figure for a country with such a 
huge, poor rural sector. However, the 
importance of dynastic connections 
suggests that even in this vibrant 
democracy there are some problems.
In the USA, the democratic problem 
is, as always, money and its connections 
with power. Efforts to limit the amount 
of money which individuals or 
corporations could spend supporting 
political candidates have been 
regularly ruled as unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court. According to the 
respected journalist, Gary Younge:
In a system where money is 
considered speech, and corporations 
are people, this trend is inevitable. 
Elections become not a system of 
participatory engagement determining 
how the country is run, but the best 
democratic charade that money can 
buy. People get a vote; but only once 
money has decided whom they can 
vote for and what the agenda should be. 
The result is a plutocracy that operates 
according to the golden rule: that those 
who have the gold make the rules.4
Once, powerful unions were able 
to provide some counterbalancing 
finance to that of corporate interests. 
However, the decline of unions and 
the almost exponential growth in the 
scale of expenditure on elections 
have greatly reduced this influence. 
However, American democracy has 
always been a bit rough-and-ready 
and tinged with corruption, though the 
scale of this may be increasing, whilst 
the very decentralised nature of US 
politics does provide scope for some 
genuine democratic initiative. The real 
centre of the democratic ‘crisis’ lies in 
Europe.
It is sometimes forgotten just 
how recent democracy is in much of 
Europe and how fractured has been its 
history. Only Sweden and the UK can 
really claim to have enjoyed unbroken 
democratic governance since the late 
nineteenth century with the gradual 
extension of the franchise to include 
women as well as the working class 
less than a hundred years ago. Even 
so, the disappearance of fascism from 
southern Europe in the 1970s followed 
by the emergence of parliamentary 
democracy in the Communist countries 
of Eastern Europe in the 1990s seemed 
to suggest that this form of governance 
was inevitable and immutable, so much 
so that in 1992, Francis Fukuyama was 
able to pronounce that:
What we may be witnessing is 
not just the end of the Cold War, 
or the passing of a particular period 
of post-war history, but the end of 
history as such: that is, the end point 
of mankind's ideological evolution and 
the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human 
government.5
Fukuyama has in recent years rather 
backtracked from this position but only 
at the margins despite the conspicuous 
failure of the efforts of the USA to 
impose liberal democracy on Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Why then the sense 
of a democratic crisis, particularly in 
Europe? In a number of ways it is the 
culmination of two trends which have 
The result is a 
plutocracy that 
operates according to 
the golden rule: that 
those who have  
the gold make the 
rules.
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been developing for years, indeed 
decades.
The first is the gradual decline of 
public involvement and interest in the 
processes of electoral democracy. The 
most obvious of these is participation in 
elections, something which appeared 
to have stabilised in Europe in a period 
from the 1950s through to the 1980s 
at around 80-85%.6 After this decade 
there was a slow but steady decline 
throughout Europe, something which 
seems to have accelerated into this 
century. In 2001, the UK had the 
lowest turnout since the advent of 
mass democracy whilst France fell to 
a record low of 60.4% in 2007. A raft 
of other countries, including Ireland, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain and Finland, 
have also recorded record lows. 
A second indicator of decline 
in involvement is increasing voting 
volatility, which is the number of 
voters who shift their party preferences 
around from election to election. This 
lack of stability in voting preference 
suggests disillusion with the democratic 
process. A third and in some ways the 
most significant, has been a major 
decline in the membership of political 
parties. The U.K. is the most extreme 
example with an aggregate loss in party 
membership over 1.1 million between 
1980 and 2009, a drop of 68%; but 
most other European countries have 
seen falls of 30-50%. There does not 
seem to be any left/right bias in this fall; 
just a uniform decline in participation.
This fall in membership has been 
accompanied and may be partly 
caused by the gradual hollowing 
out of the meaning of ‘membership’ 
which has occurred in most European 
parties. Outside of small-town direct 
democracy, political parties are the 
key agency of modern participatory 
democracy, acting as they do to 
formulate policies and to promote 
leaders. They provide the collective 
participation necessary to provide 
elected governments with some kind 
of bedrock in the popular will.
Essentially, this hollowing-out 
process involves a transformation of 
‘members’ into ‘active supporters’, that 
is people who are willing to assist with 
campaigning at elections by delivering 
leaflets and so on but who have little 
or no influence in the formation of 
party policy or the development of 
its leadership. This loss is mirrored by 
exactly the same phenomenon which 
was noted by Mbeki, the growth of a 
self-serving ‘professional political class’ 
composed of people who have made 
politics their career from an early age 
and have been promoted up the party 
ladder, often by becoming advisers to 
established politicians or, initially, by 
using family contacts. This ‘political class’ 
has become enmeshed with business 
interests, particularly in the financial 
sector, and with state agencies, to form 
a circulating but sealed elite group who 
have largely gone to the same schools 
and universities. So for many voters all 
main parties ‘are the same’ thus making 
a mockery of multi-party democracy.
The other side of the collapse of the 
membership-based party has been the 
growth of ‘wild’ parties, that is parties 
with no historical base but which 
suddenly achieve electoral success 
based on popular discontent with the 
established parties. Syriza in Greece, 
which polled 4% of the national vote 
in 2009, became the main opposition 
in 2012, and received 27% of the 
vote in the European elections, with 
the right wing governing party down 
to 23%, is the prime example of this 
phenomenon together with the U.K. 
Independence Party which topped 
the vote in the European elections also 
with 27%. More ominously in Greece 
another ‘protest’ party, the neo-Nazi 
Golden Dawn, captured almost 10% 
of the vote and came third, even 
though its leaders are being held in 
jail on charges of running a criminal 
organisation. In Italy, the Five Star Party 
founded by the comedian, Beppo 
Grillo, astonished the establishment by 
obtaining over 25% of the popular vote 
in 2013 national elections and over 
21% in the 2014 European elections 
even though the party has been racked 
by rows over the alleged autocratic 
control of its founder. 
Both Syriza and the Five Star Party 
can be seen as left-radical; but the more 
dominant trend in the growth of ‘wild’ 
parties has been that of the far-right 
anti-immigration groups such as UKIP. 
In the 2014 European election, far-right 
parties topped the poll in Denmark (the 
People’s Party with 26.6%) and France 
(National Front, 25.0%) whilst for the 
first time, more or less openly neo-Nazi 
parties – the National Democratic 
Party of Germany (NPD) and the Greek 
Golden Dawn (XA) – for the first time 
entered the European Parliament. 
This movement to the right is far from 
uniform over Europe though as a 
perceptive analysis in the Washington 
Post noted: one explanation for 
the abysmal performance of radical 
right parties in Eastern Europe is that 
mainstream right-wing parties in the 
region leave little space for the far 
right, given their authoritarian, nativist 
and populist discourse.7 The common 
feature of all the right-wing parties is 
their vituperative hatred of immigrants, 
the most disturbing of all the political 
portents in Europe.
The second trend which mirrors 
the first has been the growth in 
importance of supranational bodies, 
notably the European Commission, 
but including bodies such as the IMF, 
which have little or no democratic 
basis but which exert power within 
countries comparable to or exceeding 
their national governments. Added to 
these is another array of supranational 
bodies, the international corporations, 
in particular financial ones which 
answer to no democratic authority 
at all. A prime example of the 
combination of these two power-bases 
is the pending Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, an exceedingly 
complex treaty to be struck between 
the EU and the US government which 
amongst other things will enable 
transnational corporations to sue 
national governments inside the EU 
for any unilateral regulatory process 
which damages the interests of the 
corporation. National legislatures will 
have no say in agreeing in this package 
and, although the European Parliament 
will vote on the whole deal, it will have 
no power to amend it.
A consequence of this bipartite 
congruence is that increasingly, 
national governments are seen as 
lacking many elements of real power. 
The failure to control the international 
financial markets, even though their 
collapse in 2008 required bailouts by 
nation states, is a prime example of this. 
The result is a further decline in interest 
in electing these supine governments.
The ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU 
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has long been a topic of continual 
if ineffective debate. Essentially, the 
problem has always been that closer 
national ties have always had political 
objectives but these have been disguised 
as economic matters. Initially these 
could be seen as the benign hope that 
closer trade links would extinguish any 
possibility of wars between European 
states like those which had effectively 
blighted the first half of the twentieth 
century. However, the changes in the 
name of this economic system, the 
Coal and Steel Community (1950), 
the European Economic Community 
(1957), the European Community 
(1993), and, finally, the European 
Union (2007) precisely mapped the 
gradual, if still largely implicit, shift 
towards political unity. This also reflects 
the enlargement of the EU which now 
includes 27 countries, quadrupling its 
original size, all without much in the 
way of democratic agreement by the 
electorates of the member countries.
The gradual evolution of the EU into 
a blatantly political body made a step 
jump in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty 
which set up the euro as a common 
currency and established the so-called 
‘three pillars’ of economics, foreign and 
military cooperation and home and 
judicial affairs, all largely undefined 
in the usual way of using generalised 
phrases which could later be turned 
into specific policy actions without 
any democratic basis. Maastricht was 
remodelled and refined by a series 
of further treaties (Amsterdam, 1997, 
Nice 2001, Lisbon 2007), all complex 
and all pushed through with almost no 
popular democratic approval. Nearly 
all attempts to put these treaties to 
popular vote have resulted in debacle. 
In 1992, the Danes rejected Maastricht 
and the French very nearly did so. 
In 2007, the only country to risk a 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, 
Ireland,  had it rejected and was forced 
to run another vote in which every 
screw was put on the electorate to vote 
Yes or, allegedly, risk oblivion. In fact 
real oblivion came in 2008 when the 
financial crisis resulted in the European 
Commission, backed by the European 
Central Bank and the IMF, stepping in 
to dictate economic policy in Greece, 
Ireland and most of southern Europe, 
insisting that elected governments be 
replaced by appointed technocratic 
leaders if they failed in their duty to 
apply the financial austerity necessary 
to save the European banking system, 
something which actually happened in 
Greece and Italy.
It is an odd irony that the problem 
of the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU is widely recognised even 
within the autocratic corridors of the 
European Commission just as they 
are being filled with the appointed 
new Commissioners who epitomise 
the problem. Even more ironic is the 
fact that any move to alter the current 
position would almost certainly require 
a treaty change, something which 
is very unlikely to get past popular 
opinion in several EU member states 
whose populations are itching to slap 
down Brussels if not to actually leave. 
It seems likely that the U.K., always 
the most eurosceptic member, will 
have some form of referendum on 
membership in the next three years 
which could easily result in the U.K.’s 
departure and precipitate further 
disorder. Meanwhile, the imposed 
austerity programmes in southern 
Europe which have led to economic 
stagnation continue to fester.
The root causes of the decline in 
democratic participation throughout 
Europe are hard to uncover. However 
it is striking that the moment in which 
decline really began is also that in 
which neoliberal individualism bit 
back against the collectivism which 
had characterised Europe throughout 
the last century up the 1980s. As Weir 
puts it when discussing the decline of 
the mass party:
A tendency to dissipation and 
fragmentation also marks the broader 
organisational environment within 
which the classic mass parties used to 
nest. As workers’ parties, or as religious 
parties, the mass organisations in Europe 
rarely stood on their own but constituted 
just the core element within a wider 
and more complex organizational 
network of trade unions, churches 
and so on. Beyond the socialist and 
religious parties, additional networks ... 
combined with political organisations 
to create a generalized pattern of 
social and political segmentation that 
helped root the parties in the society 
and to stabilize and distinguish their 
electorates. Over the past thirty years, 
however, these broader networks have 
been breaking up ... With the increasing 
individualization of society, traditional 
collective identities and organizational 
affiliations count for less, including 
those that once formed part of party-
centred networks.8
It is a depressing but undeniably 
plausible conjecture to link decline 
in the most fundamental aspect of 
progressive advance in the twentieth 
century, mass electoral democracy, 
with the resurgence of the most 
regressive, neo-liberal markets. It does 
suggest that reversing the decline in 
electoral democracy will need more 
than some simple turnaround in 
party policy. Speculation as to just 
where this dual crisis of democratic 
legitimacy is going would double the 
size of this essay and lead precisely 
nowhere.  There are some dark forces 
gathering and it is almost inevitable 
that several countries are going to 
face serious political challenges from 
anti-immigration groups. There are 
some vibrant progressive forces which 
emerged, notably Syriza in Greece, but 
they are internationally isolated and 
have, so far, failed to find a coherent 
strategic opposition policy. 
In the National Archaeological 
Museum in Athens, there is currently 
a temporary exhibition celebrating 
the shared cultural history of Greece 
and Italy. One exhibit is a small 
relief of a “Mourning Athena”. The 
accompanying description of this 
concludes by suggesting that “the 
contemplative expression of Athena 
reflects the sceptical way in which 
we should view the current political 
situation in Europe”. When doubts 
about Europe’s political future appear 
inscribed in archaeological  analysis we 
know that we are in trouble. ■
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